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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS  
WILLIAM S. DODGE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Morton Horwitz dates the full emergence of the public-private 
distinction in law to the nineteenth century.  “One of the central goals 
of nineteenth century legal thought was to create a clear separation 
between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law—public law—
and the law of private transactions—torts, contracts, property, and 
commercial law.”1 The purpose of the distinction was “to stake out 
distinctively private spheres free from the encroaching power of the 
state”2 and to create “a neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine 
and legal reasoning free from what was thought to be the dangerous 
and unstable redistributive tendencies of democratic politics.”3 In the 
early twentieth century, the public-private distinction came under at-
tack, particularly from legal realists who argued that because private-
law rights were enforced by the state they should be conceptualized 
as delegations of public power to private individuals.4 “By 1940, it was 
a sign of legal sophistication to understand the arbitrariness of the di-
vision of law into public and private realms.”5 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My thanks to Hannah 
Buxbaum and Mary Kay Kane for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1423, 1424 (1982). 
 2. Id. at 1423; see also Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Dis-
agreement and Academic Reputation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982) (“The distinction 
between public and private connects with a central tenet of liberal thought: the insistence that 
because individuals have rights, there are limits on the power of government vis-à-vis the indi-
vidual.”). 
 3. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1425. 
 4. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585-92 (1933); 
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12-14 (1927). 
 5. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1426; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of 
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (tracing the public/private distinc-
tion from its heyday to its demise). 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore whether a public-private 
distinction exists in the conflict of laws, as well as the nature of that 
distinction and whether it ought to be maintained.  At first glance, a 
public-private distinction would certainly seem to exist in the conflict 
of laws.  For example, a court’s approach to determining the applica-
ble law in a suit touching multiple jurisdictions differs dramatically 
depending on whether the claim is one of tort or antitrust.  In a torts 
case, the court looks to the particular forum’s choice-of-law rules to 
determine which jurisdiction’s substantive law should apply.  If the 
answer is foreign law, the court applies that law and decides the case 
on the merits.6 In an antitrust case, by contrast, the court does not 
look to the forum’s choice-of-law rules to decide which antitrust law 
should govern.  Instead, it construes its own antitrust law to decide 
whether that law reaches the case, and if it does not, the court simply 
dismisses the claim. Under no circumstances does the court decide 
the case by applying foreign antitrust law.7 
One may identify at least two basic differences in the approaches 
taken by courts. First, in the private law context, the court answers 
the question of applicable law by resorting to rules that are external to 
the substantive law, specifically by applying the forum’s choice-of-law 
rules.  In the context of public law, the court’s method is internal—it 
looks for the answer to the applicability question in the substantive 
law itself. Second, in the private law context, a court will apply for-
eign law to decide a case if it determines that foreign law governs.  In 
the public law context, the court will not apply foreign law but will 
dismiss the case if it finds the forum’s law inapplicable.  In other 
words, in private law cases the court asks which substantive law ap-
plies, while in public law cases it asks whether the forum’s substantive 
law applies. 
A number of scholars have noted the similarity of the applicable-
law question in the public-law and private-law realms and have urged 
that conflicts principles be used to define the extraterritorial reach of 
regulatory legislation.8 For the most part, however, these scholars ac-
 
 6. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 7. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168-69 (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Gov-
ernment Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 997-98 (1994); Gary B. Born, A Reap-
praisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1992); Lea 
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1987); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in 
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cept the external-internal and which-whether distinctions described 
above.  In his seminal article on the subject, Donald Trautman con-
ceded that a court construing a regulatory statute must ultimately 
ground its decision upon legislative intent: “Strictly the job of the 
judge is to apply the statute within the limits laid down by Congress.”9 
Trautman further noted that “[a] court faced with the question 
whether to apply its regulatory statute does not have the alternative 
of applying some other statute as a substitute except where the for-
eign statute provides private remedies enforceable by the forum; the 
choice is simply whether or not to apply the statute of the forum.”10 
Trautman and others have argued that conflicts thinking should influ-
ence the interpretation of regulatory statutes, but not that the rules of 
conflicts should be applied directly to them. 
In Part I of this paper, I point out that courts have long been do-
ing precisely what Trautman and others have urged.  Although 
choice-of-law rules have not been applied directly to regulatory stat-
utes, they have long influenced the approaches courts have taken in 
interpreting the extraterritorial reach of such statutes.  As choice-of-
law rules have changed, so too have the ways in which courts construe 
the scope of regulatory statutes.  Parts II and III examine the exter-
nal-internal and which-whether distinctions in more detail.  Part II 
shows that the core of the external-internal distinction is the courts’ 
perceived need to ground decisions about the applicability of public 
law in legislative intent.  The problem is that there is often no real 
evidence of legislative intent with respect to when a statute, the pur-
pose of which would be served by applying it, should not be applied 
to serve other ends.  It would be better for courts to assume responsi-
bility for formulating rules to handle such cases, as they do with pri-
vate law.  Part III examines the reasons for the which-whether distinc-
tion, arguing that the reasons for refusing to apply foreign public law 
 
the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their 
Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311 (1979-II); Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts 
Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 586 (1961).  Others have been more skeptical. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-
Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992); Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of 
Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 39 (1987); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection 
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1982). 
 9. Trautman, supra note 8, at 587. 
 10. Id. at 617. 
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are generally unconvincing.  Only the need to ensure reciprocity justi-
fies such a distinction, but the distinction it supports is one between 
public and private plaintiffs, not public and private laws.  The last sec-
tion concludes. 
I. THE INFLUENCE OF CONFLICTS ON 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Changing theories about the conflict of laws have long had an in-
direct influence on the interpretation of regulatory statutes.11 Take 
the example of antitrust.  Over the past century, U.S. courts have 
adopted three distinct approaches to the extraterritorial scope of the 
Sherman Act: (1) a territorial approach; (2) an effects approach; and 
(3) a balancing approach.  Each has been heavily influenced by de-
velopments in the conflict of laws. 
The Supreme Court first construed the scope of the Sherman Act 
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.12  Justice Holmes held 
that the Act did not extend to the anticompetitive activities of a U.S. 
company in Central America. 
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an 
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of 
the country where the act is done.  Slater v. Mexican National R.R. 
Co., 194 U. S. 120, 126. . . .  This principle was carried to an extreme 
in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Massachusetts, 374.  For another jurisdic-
tion, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him ac-
cording to its own notions rather than those of the place where he 
did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference 
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of 
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.13 
As Larry Kramer has observed, Holmes’s analysis was “pure conflict 
of laws.”14 Each of the authorities on which he relied was either a con-
flicts case or a conflicts treatise.  The first was his own opinion in Sla-
ter, a torts case and the leading judicial statement of the “vested 
rights” theory of conflicts that then prevailed.  The vested rights the-
ory was based on a territorial view of sovereign power.  Although 
 
 11. For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws 
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 110-43 (1998). 
 12. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 13. Id. at 356 (citing Phillips v. Eyre, (1869) 4 L.R.Q.B. 225, 239 (U.K.), aff’d, (1870) 6 
L.R.Q.B. 1, 28 (U.K.)); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 647 (2d ed. 1908). 
 14. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 
SUP. CT. REV. 179, 186. 
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foreign law was not “operative outside its own territory,” it could cre-
ate an obligation within its own territory that other courts would en-
force.15 Under this theory, “the only source of this obligation is the 
law of the place of the act.”16 But while Holmes looked to the conflict 
of laws for guidance in American Banana, he did not apply its rules 
directly to the Sherman Act.  Instead he adopted a presumption 
about legislative intent based upon those rules.  “The foregoing con-
siderations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any stat-
ute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the terri-
torial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate 
power.”17 
The vested rights theory soon crumbled under attacks from legal 
realists during the 1920s and 30s and was ultimately supplanted by a 
series of approaches authorizing the forum to apply its own law.  In 
Guiness v. Miller,18 Judge Learned Hand articulated what came to be 
known as the “local law” theory.19 Its basic premise was that “no court 
can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign,” although Hand 
noted that a court would “impose[] an obligation of its own as nearly 
homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort oc-
curs.”20 Though criticized by some as mere wordplay,21 the local law 
theory importantly emphasized the autonomy of the forum in decid-
ing what law to apply.  In the 1930s, a series of conflicts opinions by 
Justice Stone relaxed the territoriality of the vested rights theory as a 
matter of constitutional law and began to emphasize governmental 
interests as a basis for choosing the applicable law.22 In Pacific Em-
ployers, Stone held that the forum could apply its own law even 
 
 15. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). 
 16. Id. 
 17. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
 18. 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
 19. See generally David F. Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 
(1950). 
 20. Guiness, 291 F. at 770. 
 21. See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, Private International Law: Fundamental Approaches, in III 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 10-11 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1986) 
(“If this notion were to be transposed from the realm of law to that of languages, the conclusion 
would have to be: If an Englishman speaks French, he speaks English in reality, fashioned as 
nearly as possible in conformity with French.”). 
 22. See Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accidents Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pac. Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
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though another state might apply its law “with respect to the same 
persons and events.”23 
The impact of these developments on the interpretation of the 
Sherman Act can be seen in Hand’s 1945 decision in United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), which broke with American Ba-
nana and applied the Act extraterritorially on the basis of effects: 
[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach li-
ability to the conduct outside the United States of persons not in al-
legiance to it.  That being so, the only question open is whether 
Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own 
Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of the United States, 
we cannot look beyond our own law.  Nevertheless, it is quite true 
that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, 
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations 
upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally cor-
respond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’ We should not im-
pute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, 
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.24 
Turning to those limitations, Hand observed, “it is settled law . . . that 
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within 
its borders which the state reprehends.”25 Thus, Hand construed the 
Sherman Act to reach anticompetitive agreements between foreign 
companies outside the United States “if they were intended to affect 
imports and did affect them.”26 
Hand’s line in Alcoa that “as a court of the United States, we 
cannot look beyond our own law” obviously echoes his statement in 
Guiness that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sover-
eign.”27 At the same time, the conflicts rule to which Hand looked to 
authorize the application of the forum’s law on the basis of effects re-
flects the influence of Justice Stone’s opinions loosening the restraints 
of territoriality.  It is also worth noting that Hand, like Holmes, did 
 
 23. Pac. Employers, 306 U.S. at 502.  Brainerd Currie would later develop Stone’s ap-
proach into what became known as “governmental interest analysis.”  Currie wrote: “If the 
court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its policy, it should apply the 
law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its con-
trary policy . . . .”  BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184 
(1963). 
 24. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 444. 
 27. Guiness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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not apply conflicts rules directly to the Sherman Act but rather read 
congressional intent against the background of those rules: “We 
should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts 
can catch . . . .”28 
In time, some courts adopted a third approach to the Sherman 
Act that balanced U.S. interests against those of other nations.  In 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,29 the court proposed to 
weigh a variety of factors to determine “whether the interests of, and 
links to, the United States—including the magnitude of the effect on 
American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those 
of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”30 
In developing this approach, Timberlane drew expressly on conflicts: 
“We believe that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper ap-
proach, as was suggested, if not specifically employed, in Alcoa.”31 Of 
course, Alcoa had employed a conflicts approach, but the rules of 
conflicts had evolved in the interim.  Most significantly, the 1971 Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts had adopted a “most significant rela-
tionship” test32 that asked courts to consider the contacts of each ju-
risdiction to the case and a series of factors set forth in Section 6.  
Timberlane’s balancing approach was quite similar, and indeed the 
court cited Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) in support.33 
Once again, the court did not apply choice-of-law rules directly 
to the statute, but seemed to think them relevant to an analysis of 
what Congress intended, as Timberlane’s reliance on Alcoa would in-
dicate.34 Other advocates of this balancing approach have more ex-
plicitly justified it in terms of congressional intent.  Writing in dissent 
in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,35 Justice Scalia noted that de-
cisions like Timberlane had “tempered the extraterritorial application 
 
 28. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added); see also id. (“the only question open is 
whether Congress intended to impose the liability”). 
 29. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 30. Id. at 613. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 (1971). 
 33. See Timberlane, 549 F.3d at 614 n.29 (1976). 
 34. See id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 
443 (2d Cir. 1945)) (“[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without re-
gard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limi-
tations which generally correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”). 
 35. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
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of the Sherman Act with considerations of ‘international comity.’”36 
He emphasized that this comity was “exercised by legislatures when 
they enact laws”37 and that courts construing statutes in the light of 
comity were simply following the presumed intent of those legisla-
tures. 
In sum, courts have again and again looked to conflicts rules for 
guidance in construing the Sherman Act.  Courts have not applied 
these conflicts rules directly, as they would to private law, but have 
instead viewed the rules as relevant to the question of legislative in-
tent.  As the conflicts rules have changed from vested rights, to the 
law of the forum, to interest balancing, so too has the courts’ con-
struction of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach. 
II. THE EXTERNAL-INTERNAL DISTINCTION 
Although developments in the conflict of laws have clearly influ-
enced the ways in which courts construe the reach of public-law stat-
utes like the Sherman Act, there still appear to be large methodologi-
cal differences between multijurisdictional tort cases and 
multijurisdictional antitrust cases.  One such difference is what we 
might call the external-internal distinction.  In a torts case, the court 
looks to conflicts rules external to the substantive law to tell what law 
governs.  In an antitrust case, the court does not apply external 
choice-of-law rules.  Rather, it looks for legislative intent. 
Choice-of-law rules are, by definition, external to the substantive 
law.  Section 4 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts expressly dis-
tinguishes between a state’s “rules of Conflict of Laws” and its “local 
law.”38 Choice-of-law rules “do not themselves determine the rights 
and liabilities of the parties, but rather guide decisions as to which lo-
cal law rule will be applied to determine these rights and duties.”39 In 
 
 36. Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 4(1) (1971). Conflict of laws rules include 
not only the choice-of-law rules that are the focus of this paper, but also rules on judicial juris-
diction and the enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. § 2, cmt. a. 
 39. Id. § 2, cmt. a. In the United States, choice-of-law rules are typically rules of judge-
made common law. About half the states follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts, but a number continue to follow the traditional approach of the first Restatement, 
while others have adopted distinct approaches.  For a listing of methodologies, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 697, 713 (2006). 
DODGE_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:20:56 PM 
2008] PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 379 
 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp.,40 to take a recent example, Judge 
Posner looked to Illinois’s choice-of-law rules to decide whether Illi-
nois’s rule of comparative negligence or Mexico’s rule of contributory 
negligence should apply to a tort claim by an Illinois resident arising 
from an injury in Mexico. Illinois had adopted the approach of the 
Restatement (Second), so because Mexico had the most significant re-
lationship to the issue, Posner applied Mexico’s substantive law and 
granted summary judgment for the defendant. 
When the plaintiff’s claim is based on public law, a court’s ap-
proach is different.  As we saw in Part I, courts do not apply choice-
of-law rules directly to decide whether a regulatory statute like the 
Sherman Act reaches a particular case, even though their approaches 
have been strongly influenced by those rules.  Instead, courts have 
sought their answers within the substantive law itself, grounding their 
decisions about extraterritorial scope in the intent of the legislature. 
Sometimes Congress speaks directly to the extraterritorial scope 
of its regulatory laws.  After the Supreme Court construed Title VII 
to not apply extraterritorially,41 Congress amended it to provide that, 
“[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, [‘employee’] in-
cludes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.”42  It further 
specified that Title VII would not apply to foreign companies abroad 
unless they were controlled by American employers43 and would not 
apply in cases where the discrimination abroad was compelled by for-
eign law.44 To take another example, Congress provided in the For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) that the 
Sherman Act does not apply to anticompetitive conduct that affects 
only foreign markets.45 
Frequently, though, Congress does not specify the extraterrito-
rial reach of its regulatory laws.  In these cases, courts employ a series 
 
 40. Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 41. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
 43. Id. § 2000e-1(c). 
 44. Id. § 2000e-1(b). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains simi-
lar provisions specifying its extraterritorial scope. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1), 623(h), 630(f). 
 45. More specifically, the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving commerce with 
foreign nations other than import commerce unless such conduct has “a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce and such conduct gives rise to “a claim” under 
the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
DODGE_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:20:56 PM 
380 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:371 
 
of presumptions about legislative intent.46 One of these is the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality: “that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.”47 Applying this presumption 
in Aramco, the Supreme Court held that Title VII (prior to its 
amendment in 1991) did not apply to employment discrimination by 
an American employer against an American citizen in Saudi Arabia.  
The Court framed the question as one of legislative intent: “It is our 
task to determine whether Congress intended the protections of Title 
VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American em-
ployers outside of the United States.”48 The Court then turned to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as “‘a valid approach whereby 
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.’”49 The pre-
sumption assumes that Congress wants to avoid “unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in in-
ternational discord,”50 and that Congress “‘is primarily concerned 
with domestic conditions.’”51 
A second presumption to which courts sometimes turn is the so-
called Charming Betsy presumption that “an act of congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains.”52 Like the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, the Charming Betsy presumption is frequently justified as a 
reflection of congressional intent.  “It is generally assumed that Con-
gress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the 
United States,” explains the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law.53 Dissenting in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,54 Jus-
 
 46. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy presump-
tion). 
 47. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley 
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For further discussion of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, see William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extra-
territoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998). 
 48. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
 49. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 52. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115, cmt. a (1987). For dis-
cussion of alternative justifications, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 
(1998). 
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tice Scalia employed the presumption in just this way.  Section 403 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law says that customary 
international law prohibits the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction 
when it would be unreasonable based on an evaluation of factors like 
those set forth in Timberlane.55 After weighing those factors, Justice 
Scalia concluded that application of the Sherman Act would be un-
reasonable and that “therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the 
absence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has 
made such an assertion.”56 Justice Scalia termed the resulting defer-
ence to the interests of other nations “prescriptive comity,”57 and he 
took care to describe it as a matter of legislative intent rather than ju-
dicial fiat.  Prescriptive comity, he wrote, “is not the comity of courts, 
whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more ap-
propriately adjudged elsewhere.”58 Instead it “is exercised by legisla-
tures when they enact laws, and courts assume it has been exercised 
when they come to interpreting the scope of laws their legislatures 
have enacted.”59 
“Prescriptive comity” moved from dissent to majority in the F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. case.60 At issue was 
whether anticompetitive conduct that both occurred abroad and af-
fected the plaintiffs there was exempted from the reach of the 
Sherman Act by the FTAIA.  Although Justice Breyer looked to the 
language of the FTAIA61 and to its legislative history,62 he relied heav-
ily upon a “rule of construction” interpreting ambiguous statutes so as 
 
 54. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403.  Whether § 403 in fact 
reflects customary international law is a matter of some controversy.  See David B. Massey, 
How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement 
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419 (1997). 
 56. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s analy-
sis, see Dodge, supra note 11, at 138-43.  The majority read § 403 as limited to situations where a 
party subject to regulation by two states cannot comply with the laws of both. Hartford, 509 U.S. 
at 798-99.  Although the FTAIA addresses the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act 
in some circumstances, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, the majority thought it was 
unclear whether the FTAIA would apply and concluded that the anticompetitive conduct al-
leged in Hartford would satisfy its standard in any event. Id. at 796 n.23.  Justice Scalia appar-
ently did not think the FTAIA applicable, for he did not mention it. 
 57. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60. 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004). 
 61. Id. at 161-62, 173-74. 
 62. Id. at 169-73. 
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“to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations.”63 As with the other presumptions we have seen, 
Breyer’s presumption against unreasonable interference was prem-
ised upon congressional intent.  “This rule of statutory construction 
cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the legiti-
mate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American 
laws.”64 
Is the external-internal distinction I have sketched more appar-
ent than real? After all, external choice-of-law rules often direct 
courts to look internally at the purpose of a law in a way that resem-
bles a search for legislative intent.  At the same time, the presump-
tions about legislative intent to which courts often resort when con-
struing regulatory statutes might be characterized as external choice-
of-law rules in disguise.  We shall examine each of these challenges in 
turn. 
Modern choice-of-law rules tend to give great weight to govern-
mental interests.  The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts says that “the 
state whose interests are most deeply affected should have its local 
law applied.”65 In evaluating those interests, courts typically examine 
the purpose of each jurisdiction’s substantive law to see if that pur-
pose would be served by applying it to the case at hand.  In Babcock 
v. Jackson, for example, the New York Court of Appeals observed 
that, 
[t]he object of Ontario’s guest statute . . . is ‘to prevent the 
fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with 
 
 63. Id. at 164.  Whether such a rule of construction exists is an important question.  The 
authorities Breyer cited do not state such a rule but rely instead on the quite different rule that 
“an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) 
(emphasis added).  Justice Breyer’s citation of Restatement (Third) § 403 suggests that he was 
relying upon it for the proposition that customary international law forbids unreasonable exer-
cises of prescriptive jurisdiction, but as noted above the accuracy of § 403 as a statement of cus-
tomary international law is contested.  See supra note 55. In any event, Justice Breyer did not 
endorse the case-by-case weighing of factors envisioned in § 403, commenting that “this ap-
proach is too complex to prove workable.” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. 
 64. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6, cmt. f (1971); see, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 
432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (“The forum must search to find the proper law to apply based 
upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states.”); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 
279, 283 (N.Y. 1963) (“Justice . . . may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of 
the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties 
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”). 
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the drivers, against insurance companies’ . . . and quite obvi-
ously, the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by the 
statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their 
insurance carriers.66 
Because Babcock involved a New York defendant, Ontario’s purpose 
would not be served by applying its law.  “Whether New York defen-
dants are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York 
plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply be-
cause the accident occurred there.”67 
The distinction between interest analysis and legislative intent 
becomes apparent, however, in the case of “true conflicts”: when the 
purpose of each state’s law would be served by applying it.  In Off-
shore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,68 the California Supreme 
Court faced a conflict between two state statutes.  California’s statute 
would have permitted the plaintiff corporation to recover for the loss 
of an injured employee’s services, while Louisiana’s statute would 
have protected the defendant corporation against liability.  The pur-
pose of each statute would have been served by applying it to the 
case,69 so the court had to choose.  It chose Louisiana’s statute, not on 
the basis of legislative intent but by applying an external choice-of-
law rule, specifically the court’s “comparative impairment” ap-
proach.70 The court candidly admitted that “the resolution of true 
conflict cases may be described as ‘essentially a process of allocating 
respective spheres of lawmaking influence.’”71 The important point is 
that those spheres were allocated not by a legislature but by the court, 
through its adoption of a particular choice-of-law rule.  The Court 
never asked if the California legislature would have intended its stat-
ute to give way in the face of a stronger foreign interest. 
One may also challenge the external-internal distinction by ask-
ing whether the presumptions about legislative intent that courts fre-
 
 66. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 358, 366 (1936)). 
 67. Id.; see also Reich, 432 P.2d at 730-31 (examining purpose of Missouri’s wrongful death 
statute). 
 68. 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978). 
 69. Id. at 725. 
 70. “[T]he ‘comparative impairment’ approach . . . seeks to determine which state’s interest 
would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.”  Id. at 
726. 
 71. Id. (quoting William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 11-12 (1963)). 
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quently apply to regulatory statutes are not in fact external choice-of-
law rules.  It should be obvious that these presumptions are at least 
not the same external choice-of-law rules that courts apply to private 
law.  Although Empagran’s presumption against unreasonable inter-
ference with the sovereign authority of other nations bears some re-
semblance to the most-significant-relationship test of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts, it also differs from that test by, for example, re-
jecting the notion of a case-by-case balancing test.72 Aramco’s pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality harkens back to the choice-of-law 
rules of an earlier era, which only a few courts continue to apply to-
day.73  The Charming Betsy presumption has no analogue in choice-
of-law jurisprudence since it is designed to mediate not between the 
local laws of various jurisdictions but between local law and interna-
tional law.  It shapes the extraterritorial application of regulatory 
statutes only when joined with international law rules on prescriptive 
jurisdiction to create what Justice Scalia described as “prescriptive 
comity.”74 
The real reason the presumptions applied to regulatory statutes 
cannot properly be characterized as external choice of law rules, 
however, is that they are all ultimately justified on the basis of legisla-
tive intent in a way that choice-of-law rules are not.  “Prescriptive 
comity,” Justice Scalia wrote in Hartford, is not exercised by courts 
but “by legislatures when they enact laws.”75  The presumption 
against unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations “cautions courts to assume that legislators take account 
of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write 
American laws.”76 The presumption against extraterritoriality is de-
fended as “‘a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional in-
tent may be ascertained.’”77 Even if the congressional intent these 
presumptions embody is imaginary, the court purports to be carrying 
out the will of the legislature when the issue is one of public law.  In 
 
 72. See supra note 63. 
 73. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 184 (characterizing the presumption as an “anachro-
nism”). 
 74. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
 77. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley 
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
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the context of private law, by contrast, legislative intent is relevant 
only insofar as the court’s own choice-of-law rules have made it so. 
One might hypothesize that this distinction reflects the presence 
of a statute in one case and not in the other.  When a court must de-
termine whether a statute applies, it seems natural to look for legisla-
tive intent.  When a court is deciding the applicability of a common-
law rule, it seems more justifiable to look to choice-of-law rules that 
are similarly judge-made.  The problem is that the presence or ab-
sence of a statute does not in fact correspond with a court’s willing-
ness to apply external choice-of-law rules.  A number of leading con-
flicts cases have applied the forum’s external choice-of-law rules to 
private law statutes just as though the rules were ones of common 
law.  Take Babcock v. Jackson, in which the New York Court of Ap-
peals adopted a “center of gravity” approach for tort conflicts and 
then applied that approach to decide that Ontario’s guest statute did 
not bar a suit between two New York residents arising out of an 
automobile accident in Ontario.78  Or take Offshore Rental Co. v. 
Continental Oil Co., in which the California Supreme Court applied 
its “comparative impairment” approach to choose a Louisiana statute 
barring a corporation from recovering for the loss of an injured em-
ployee’s services as the governing law over a contrary statute of its 
own state.79  Or consider Schmidt v. Briscoll Hotel, in which the Min-
nesota Supreme Court framed the issue of whether Minnesota’s dram 
shop act applied to an accident in Wisconsin solely in terms of 
whether it should depart from the rules of the first Restatement of 
Conflicts.80 
Instead, whether the court applies external choice-of-law rules or 
searches internally for intent seems to turn on whether the court per-
ceives the statute to create rules of private or of public law.  But this 
distinction is vulnerable for two reasons.  First, it ignores the legal re-
alists’ attack on the public-private distinction more generally, that be-
cause private-law rights are enforced by the state they should be con-
 
 78. 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963). 
 79. 583 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1978). 
 80. 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1957).  There are counter examples, of course.  In Graham 
v. Gen. U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 248 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. 1969), the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois refused to apply its “center of gravity” rule to Illinois’s dram shop act, id. at 659, observing 
that “the question of whether the Dram Shop Act should be given extraterritorial effect is a 
question of policy that is particularly within the province of the legislature.”  Id. at 660.  Gra-
ham, however, seems to be unusual in treating a private-law statute this way. 
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ceptualized as delegations of public power to private individuals.81 It 
is widely recognized today that rules of contracts, torts, property, and 
the like do reflect considerations of public policy.  Second, the distinc-
tion overlooks the private-law roots of many public-law statutes.  
“The congressmen who drafted and passed the Sherman Antitrust 
Law thought they were merely declaring illegal offenses that the 
common law had always prohibited.”82  The Supreme Court has noted 
that the Sherman Act “invokes the common law,”83 and has treated it 
as “a common-law statute” authorizing judicial development in the 
tradition of the common law.84  So too with statutory provisions on se-
curities fraud, which the Court recently noted have “common-law 
roots.”85  In the end, it is not at all clear that antitrust law is funda-
mentally different from unfair competition in torts, or securities fraud 
from common-law fraud. 
Even if there is no particular reason to distinguish between pub-
lic and private law and to give primacy to legislative intent with re-
spect to the former, one might wonder if there is any particular harm 
in doing so, particularly when so much of the actual work is done by 
judicially created presumptions.  It seems useful here to divide the in-
tent inquiry into two separate questions: (1) would applying a regula-
tory statute advance its purposes; and (2) should its application never-
theless be limited to serve other ends? The first question is usually 
easy to answer for both public and private law.86 The second is far 
more difficult.  When the legislature speaks directly to the applicabil-
ity question, of course the court must obey.87 And sometimes legisla-
 
 81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 82. William Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 355, 355 (1954); see also Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Pol-
icy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759 (1955); 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (“It does 
not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the com-
mon law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government.”).  That the Act 
went beyond the existing common law, see Letwin, supra, at 385; Dewey, supra, at 786, does not 
undercut the point that the subject matter was one traditionally treated by the common law. 
 83. Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
 84. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007). 
 85. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005); see also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 846-55 (4th ed. 2001) (describing 
relationship between SEC fraud concepts and common law deceit). 
 86. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
 87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6(1) (2007) (“A court, subject to consti-
tutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”). 
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tures do provide explicit instruction, in both the areas of public law88 
and private law.89  But usually there is only silence on the second 
question.90  Indeed, sometimes the silence seems deliberate.  As the 
courts’ approach to the Sherman Act swung during the twentieth cen-
tury from territoriality to effects to balancing, Congress declined to 
amend the statute to clarify its extraterritorial reach.  When Congress 
passed the FTAIA in 1982, the House Report stated that the Act was 
“intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial rec-
ognition of the special international characteristics of transactions.  If 
a court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdic-
tion are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts’ ability to 
employ notions of comity, see, e.g., Timberlane.”91 Under these cir-
cumstances, to say that any particular approach to the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act reflects congressional intent is simply 
fanciful.  It allows the courts to avoid responsibility for making the 
difficult policy choices involved, a responsibility they have willingly 
and ably assumed in the context of private law. 
III. THE WHICH-WHETHER DISTINCTION 
Another distinction between private and public law cases con-
cerns the court’s willingness to apply foreign law.  In multijurisdic-
tional tort suits, if the forum’s choice-of-law rules point to foreign 
law, courts will routinely apply that law and decide the case on the 
merits.92 In multijurisdictional antitrust suits, courts dismiss the case if 
they find that the forum’s law does not apply.  They never apply for-
eign antitrust law.  In Empagran, for example, foreign vitamin pur-
chasers in Australia, Ecuador, Panama, and Ukraine brought suit 
 
 88. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (specifying the extraterritorial scope of Title VII). 
 89. Section 1-105 of the original UCC provided that the Code should be applied “to trans-
actions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.”  Revised Article 1 would have eliminated 
the bias in favor of forum law and referred courts to the choice-of-law rules of the forum, but 
each of the 29 states to have adopted Revised Article 1 as of this writing has retained the UCC’s 
original provision on applicability.  See Uniform Law Commission, Final Acts and Legislation 
by State, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited March 28, 2008). 
 90. This should not be surprising if, as the Aramco Court noted, Congress “‘is primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions.’”  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (em-
phasis added).  The Supreme Court noted in Hartford that Congress had declined to take a posi-
tion on Timberlane.  See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993). 
 92. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Mexi-
can tort law). 
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against defendants alleged to be involved in a price-fixing conspiracy.  
As we have seen, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act, as 
amended by the FTAIA, did not reach the foreign conduct.93 The 
Court did not consider the possibility of applying foreign antitrust law 
to decide the claims, despite the fact that Australian law, for example, 
allows private damages actions for price fixing.94 Both U.S. and for-
eign courts have expressed the view that the courts of one nation will 
not enforce the antitrust laws of another.95 The same is true of securi-
ties fraud regulation.96 
The roots of this “public law taboo”97 may be found in two rules 
that are historically distinct.98 First, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 
The Antelope, “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of 
 
 93. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004).  Having de-
cided the case on the assumption that the foreign harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct 
was independent of the domestic harm, the Supreme Court remanded for consideration of 
plaintiffs’ alternative argument that without higher prices in the U.S. the foreign harm would 
not have occurred.  Id. at 175.  On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that the U.S. harm did not 
cause the foreign harm and dismissed the case.  See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche 
Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 94. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, pt. VI, § 82 (Austl.) (authorizing damages action for vio-
lations of, inter alia, § 45A’s prohibition of price-fixing).  At the district court level, the plaintiffs 
did seek damages under foreign antitrust law, but the district court declined to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over those claims.  See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2001 
WL 761360, at *7-8 (D.D.C. 2001).  Other courts have similarly refused to exercise supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over foreign antitrust claims.  See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 
F. Supp. 702, 713 n.8 (D. Md. 2001); Info. Res., Inc. v. The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. 
Supp. 2d 411, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 95. See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 
609 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1067 (1999) (“English courts will not enforce the 
Sherman Act.”); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 891 (5th Cir. 1982), va-
cated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983) (“[W]e have little doubt that the Indonesian courts 
would quite properly refuse to entertain plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim.”); British Airways Bd. v. 
Laker Airways Ltd., (1985) 1 A.C. 58, 79 (H.L. 1984) (appeal taken from O.B.D.) (U.K.) (“The 
Clayton Act which creates the civil remedy with threefold damages for criminal offenses under 
the Sherman Act is, under English rules of conflict of laws, purely territorial in its application.”).  
One Canadian court has suggested that judgments under the Sherman Act might be enforceable 
in Canada, but not that Canadian courts might apply U.S. antitrust law to decide a case in the 
first instance.  See Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs. Inc., (1998) 58 B.C.L.R.3d 144 
(B.C.C.A.). 
 96. See, e.g., Schemmer v. Prop. Res. Ltd., (1975) 1 Ch. 273, 288 (1974) (U.K.) (“The [Secu-
rities Exchange] Act of 1934 is . . . a penal law of the United States of America and, as such, un-
enforceable in our courts.”). 
 97. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 322-26. 
 98. See generally William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
161, 165-93 (2002). 
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another.”99 Second, as Lord Mansfield wrote in Holman v. Johnson, 
“no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.”100 For 
our purposes, it is interesting to note that each of these rules was 
originally applied to prevent public-law statutes from interfering with 
private rights—the same rationale as the public-private distinction 
more generally.101 The revenue rule  developed to allow the enforce-
ment of private contracts that violated the customs laws of other 
countries.  Lord Hardwicke explained in an early English case that “if 
it should be laid down, that because goods are prohibited to be ex-
ported by the laws of any foreign country from whence they are 
brought, therefore the parties should have no remedy or action here, 
it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom.”102 The 
penal-laws rule was initially applied to prevent foreign confiscation 
statutes from barring the enforcement of debts.103 Later, in The Ante-
lope, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the rule to protect rights in 
property—specifically slaves—against the interference of foreign dec-
larations against the slave trade.104 
In the twentieth century, the function of these rules in guarding 
private rights from public encroachment was abandoned.  Courts 
stopped enforcing contracts that violated foreign customs laws and 
export restrictions.105 “[W]e should take notice of the laws of a 
friendly country, even if they are revenue laws or penal laws or politi-
cal laws,” Lord Denning wrote, “at least, to this extent, that if two 
people knowingly agree together to break the laws of a friendly coun-
try . . . then they cannot ask this court to give its aid to the enforce-
ment of their agreement.”106 With respect to confiscatory statutes, the 
United States Supreme Court went even further, ordering their en-
forcement in U.S. courts under the act of state doctrine even if the 
 
 99. 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). 
 100. (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.). 
 101. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
 102. Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55-56 (K.B.). 
 103. See Folliott v. Ogden, (1789) 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1789), aff’d, Ogden v. Fol-
liott, (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (Ch.); Wolff v. Oxholm, (1817) 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B.). 
 104. See 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 123. 
 105. See, e.g., Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., (1956) 2 Q.B. 490 (U.K.) (denying en-
forcement of contract to export jute bags from India to South Africa in violation of Indian ex-
port restrictions); Foster v. Driscoll, (1929) 1 K.B. 470, 510 (denying enforcement of a contract 
to smuggle whiskey to the United States in violation of prohibition laws). 
 106. Regazzoni, (1956) 2 Q.B. at 515-16. 
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statutes at issue allegedly violated international law.107 Instead, the 
rules were applied to bar foreign governments from enforcing judg-
ments for taxes,108 and to justify a refusal to enforce U.S. antitrust and 
securities law.109 
As the application of the revenue rule and the penal-laws prohi-
bition changed during the twentieth century, new rationales were 
found to justify them. One was the supposed difficulty of applying 
foreign law. Lord Somervell emphasized this in Government of India 
v. Taylor: “If one considers the initial stages of the process, which 
may . . . be intricate and prolonged, it would be remarkable comity if 
State B allowed the time of its courts to be expended in assisting in 
this regard the tax gatherers of State A.”110 A second rationale, which 
Judge Learned Hand thought applied both to penal liabilities and to 
taxes, was to avoid giving offense to other nations.111 In deciding 
whether to enforce the private laws or judgments of a foreign country, 
a court considers whether doing so would violate its own public pol-
icy.  “This is not a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question 
arises between private persons,” Hand said, but “[t]o pass upon the 
provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate 
should be, beyond the powers of a court. . . . It may commit the do-
mestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its 
neighbor.”112 A third rationale has been that enforcing foreign public 
law “would have the effect of furthering the governmental interests of 
a foreign country, something which our courts customarily refuse to 
do.”113 
 
 107. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 108. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying en-
forcement of Canadian tax judgment); United States v. Harden, (1963) 41 D.L.R.2d 721, 721-22, 
725 (Can.) (denying enforcement of U.S. tax judgment); India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 503-15 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (denying enforcement of Indian tax judgment). 
 109. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd, (1985) 1 A.C. 58, 79 (H.L. 1984) 
(appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (stating the English courts would not enforce the Sherman 
Act); Schemmer v. Prop. Res. Ltd., (1975) 1 Ch. 273, 288 (1974) (U.K.) (refusing to appoint re-
ceiver for assets of defendant in U.S. securities fraud suit on the ground that the Securities Ex-
change Act was “a penal law”). 
 110. Taylor, [1955] A.C. at 514. Ironically, Taylor did not involve the “initial stages” of de-
termining the tax owed but simply the enforcement of a tax judgment.  But Lord Somervell was 
unswayed: “The principle remains.  The claim is one for a tax.”  Id. 
 111. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring). 
 112. Id. at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring). 
 113. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1165 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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Most of these rationales do not withstand scrutiny.114 Foreign 
public law is inherently no more difficult to apply than foreign private 
law.  As a South African court noted, “[t]here may be difficulty in in-
terpreting foreign revenue laws but such difficulties are met with in 
relation to other foreign laws with which the Courts have on occasion 
to grapple.”115 Having to declare a foreign public law contrary to the 
forum’s public policy might, on occasion, give offense to another na-
tion, but this “would seldom be more offensive than a flat refusal to 
permit any action at all.”116 Most foreign public laws are unlikely to 
violate public policy.  “After all, every State collects taxes, every State 
has a criminal law, and nearly every State regulates commerce in one 
way or another.”117 “We are not concerned . . . about tyrannical exac-
tions of Tsarist moguls, and it makes no sense to pretend that we 
are.”118 
The argument that one nation should refuse to enforce another’s 
public law because doing so would further the other’s governmental 
interests ignores the substantial benefits that may be had from coop-
eration.119 If U.S. courts refuse to enforce Canadian tax judgments,120 
and Canadian courts refuse to enforce U.S. ones,121 each country’s 
treasury will be reduced—to the harm of both the country and those 
of its respective taxpayers who are unable similarly to evade paying 
their taxes.  The same is true of antitrust law.  A cartel member or 
monopolist may not be amenable to personal jurisdiction in the coun-
try whose laws it has violated.122 If U.S. courts refuse to enforce Cana-
dian antitrust laws, and Canadian courts refuse to enforce U.S. ones, 
some cartel members and monopolists will escape liability and, as a 
result, enrich themselves at the expense of consumers.  Of course, 
 
 114. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 208-19. 
 115. Comm’r of Taxes v. McFarland 1965 (1) SA 470 (Witwatersrand Local Div.) at 473 (S. 
Afr.); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 370 (2005) (rejecting argument that 
“courts lack the competence to examine the validity of unfamiliar foreign tax schemes”). 
 116. Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 217 (1932). 
 117. Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 323. 
 118. Id. at 421. 
 119. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 224-26. 
 120. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Harden, (1963) 41 D.L.R.2d 721, 721-22, 725 (Can.). 
 122. Many countries, including the United States, penalize anticompetitive conduct only 
when it harms domestic markets.  See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
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each country will benefit from cooperating only if the other recipro-
cates.  If U.S. judges enforce Canadian antitrust laws, they cannot be 
sure that Canadian judges will enforce U.S. antitrust laws.  Each court 
is caught in a “prisoner’s dilemma.”123 The way out of this dilemma is 
for each nation to agree to enforce the other’s regulatory laws, but 
this is something only the political branches can do.  As Russell Wein-
traub has observed in a related context, “[i]f in fact a significant sacri-
fice of United States interests results from [judicial] attempts to serve 
comity, international accommodation may . . . be retarded rather than 
advanced.  Our bargaining chips will have been given away before the 
political branches could use them.”124 
If the non-enforcement of foreign public law may be justified be-
cause of the need to ensure reciprocity, does this argument not 
equally extend to foreign private law? Refusing to enforce Mexican 
tort law in U.S. courts would create an incentive to negotiate a treaty 
with Mexico that would ensure the reciprocal enforcement of Ameri-
can tort law in Mexican courts.125 Fairness to private litigants, how-
ever, counsels against this.  In the analogous context of judgments, 
Willis Reese has noted that “the creditor is not to blame for the fact 
that the state of rendition does not accord conclusive effect to Ameri-
can judgments, and it might well be thought unfair to rob him on this 
account of the essential advantages of his judgment.”126 A defendant 
to whom Mexican tort law properly applies would similarly not be to 
blame for the fact that Mexico might not enforce American tort law.  
The defendant cannot negotiate a bargain for reciprocal enforcement 
with the United States in the same way that the Mexican government 
could, and it therefore seems unfair to punish that defendant by deny-
 
 123. See Dodge, supra note 98, at 220-26. 
 124. Weintraub, supra note 8, at 1817. 
 125. Choice-of-law treaties do exist.  In the European Union, the 1980 Rome Convention 
sets choice-of-law rules for contracts.  See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Consolidated Version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34. The EU recently adopted choice-of-
law rules for torts by regulation.  See Commission Regulation 864/2007, The Law Applicable to 
Non–contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40.  It is worth noting that these rules 
apply not just to ordinary torts but also to antitrust violations.  See id. art. 6, 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 
44 (stating rule for unfair competition and acts restricting free competition); see also id. recital 
(22), 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 41 (“The non-contractual obligations arising out of restrictions of 
competition in Article 6(3) should cover infringements of both national and Community compe-
tition law.”). 
 126. Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 
COLUM. L. REV. 783, 793 (1950). 
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ing it the defenses available under Mexican tort law, like contributory 
negligence.127 
If fairness justifies a distinction between public and private law, 
however, it is not a distinction between public and private law but 
rather between public and private plaintiffs.  A private party bringing 
an antitrust claim has been harmed no less, and has no more ability to 
negotiate for reciprocal enforcement, than a private party bringing a 
tort claim.  It is only when a foreign government brings suit in its 
regulatory capacity that a lack of reciprocity should bar enforcement 
of public law.  This is the way the penal-laws prohibition was tradi-
tionally understood.  Whether a foreign law should be considered 
“penal” “so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state,” 
the Supreme Court held in Huntington v. Attrill, “depends upon the 
question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public 
justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured 
by the wrongful act.”128  The Privy Council took the same position in a 
case arising from the same facts.  Enforcement of a foreign law at-
taching penalties would not be barred “except in cases where these 
penalties are recoverable at the instance of the State, or of an official 
duly authorized to prosecute on its behalf, or of a member of the pub-
lic in the character of a common informer.”129 
Applying these principles to a private antitrust or securities suit 
for damages should lead a court to apply foreign law to the merits if it 
determines that foreign law applies.  The court in a case like Empa-
gran could proceed to apply foreign antitrust law once it determined 
that the Sherman Act did not govern, and the plaintiffs would not 
have to refile their claims in the Australian, Ecuadorean, Panama-
nian, or Ukrainian courts. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no good reason to maintain the public-private distinc-
tion in the conflict of laws.  The external-internal distinction is prem-
ised on the false notion that it is possible to determine, in cases where 
a public-law statute is silent, when the legislature intends to restrict its 
application to serve other ends.  It would be better for courts to as-
 
 127. See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 128. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892). 
 129. Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150, 157-58 (P.C. 1892) (appeal taken from Ont.) 
(U.K.). 
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sume this responsibility themselves, as they have for private law.  
That is not to say that courts should necessarily apply the approach of 
the Restatement (Second),130 just that the approach should not differ 
depending on whether the claim is one of public or private law. 
The which-whether distinction also lacks a convincing justifica-
tion.  As a general matter, courts should treat foreign public law just 
as they do foreign private law, applying it to the merits of cases when 
they find that it properly governs.  To do so does not seem particu-
larly burdensome, nor likely to cause offense to other nations.  To the 
extent that the need to ensure reciprocity justifies a refusal to apply 
foreign public law, it is limited to situations in which a state brings suit 
to vindicate governmental interests.  It should not bar antitrust vic-
tims from enforcing their rights under foreign law any more than it 
should bar tort victims from enforcing theirs. 
In sum, it is time for courts faced with issues of public law to go 
beyond simply drawing inspiration from conflicts-of-law thinking.  It 
is time for them to treat public law—like private law—as a proper 
subject of the conflict of laws. 
 
 
 130. In the context of antitrust law, I have argued for a forum-law approach quite different 
from the Restatement (Second)’s “most significant relationship” test.  See Dodge, supra note 11, 
at 144-68. 
